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THE IMPACT OF MEDIA COVERAGE ON RAPE
SHIELD LAWS IN HIGH-PROFILE CASES: IS THE
VICTIM RECEIVING A "FAIR TRIAL"?
Megan Reidy'
The media bombards the public with information about rich and
famous celebrities daily. When a celebrity is the focus of a criminal
investigation, however, publicity takes on added significance.' In a high-
profile rape investigation, for example, not only does the media inundate
the public with information about the alleged rapist's family, career, and
life, it also floods newspapers and airwaves with information surrounding
the circumstances of the alleged sexual assault.2 The extensive media
attention given to such a rape investigation inevitably focuses on the
victim as well.3 The media allows the public to learn intimate details
about the victim's life, including information about the victim's family
and background.4  Should the media be allowed to publicize such
* B.A., History, University of Maryland, College Park; J.D. Candidate, May 2005, The
Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See Laurie Nicole Robinson, Comment, Professional Athletes-Held to a Higher
Standard and Above the Law: A Comment on High-Profile Criminal Defendants and the
Need for States to Establish High-Profile Courts, 73 IND. L.J. 1313, 1313 (1998). Media
attention in criminal cases involving professional athletes confers preferential treatment
on some athletes while singling out and making a public example of others. Id. at 1313-14.
2. See, e.g., T. R. Reed, Bryant Charged with Sex Assault, WASH. POST, July 19,
2003, at Al; Mindy Sink, No Decision Made About Charges Against Bryant, N.Y. TIMES,
July 8, 2003, at D1. After a young woman alleged that Kobe Bryant sexually assaulted
her, the media inundated the public with coverage about Bryant's personal life as well as
information pertaining to the alleged sexual assault. Id.
3. See Robert S. Stephen, Prejudicial Publicity Surrounding a Criminal Trial: What a
Trial Court Can Do to Ensure a Fair Trial in the Face of a "Media Circus," 26 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 1063, 1079 (1992) (stating that the media "scrutinized" the alleged victim who
accused William Kennedy Smith of rape); Brett Jarad Berlin, Comment, Revealing the
Constitutional Infirmities of the "Crime Victims Protection Act," Florida's New Privacy
Statute for Sexual Assault Victims, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 513, 531-33 (1995) (describing
the extensive media coverage focusing on the alleged victim in the William Kennedy
Smith rape trial in 1991).
4. See State v. Globe Communications Corp., 648 So. 2d 110, 111 (Fla. 1994) (stating
that the Globe published the name of William Kennedy Smith's accuser as well as "other
identifying information"); see also Gary F. Giampetruzzi, Note, Raped Once, But Violated
Twice: Constitutional Protection of a Rape Victim's Privacy, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 151,
153-54 (1992).
[T]he media . . . often display[s] insensitivity in reporting the nature and
circumstances of a sexual assault. At times, "the media continue to glorify and
romanticize violent sexual behavior." The rape victim may also suffer
insensitivity and mistreatment from the police, medical professionals, and the
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information about the victim and thus compromise the victim's right to
privacy? If so, does knowledge of this potentially damaging information
ultimately impact whether the alleged victim receives a "fair trial"?
In an effort to ensure that rape victims receive a "fair trial," state
legislatures, as well as the Federal Government, have enacted rape shield
statutes. Such legislation recognizes that rape is unlike any other crime;'
it is the only crime in which the criminal justice system treats victims as
defendants.7 Unlike other crimes, rape encompasses stereotypical views
public. As a consequence, rape victims often decline to seek justice against the
perpetrator of the crime. Thus, although the changes in public attitudes towards
rape, the effects of the women's liberation movement, and the increased
sensitivity of the criminal justice system have resulted in an increase in reported
rapes, rape is still one of the most underreported crimes.
Id.
5. See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 152
(Jennifer Hammer ed., 1999) (noting that "a rape law reform movement ... urged courts
and legislatures to treat rape the same as other crimes"). Rape shield laws were the
legislative response to a rape law reform movement that gained momentum during the
1970s and 1980s. Id.; Jason M. Price, Constitutional Law-Sex, Lies and Rape Shield
Statutes: The Constitutionality of Interpreting Rape Shield Statutes to Exclude Evidence
Relating to the Victim's Motive to Fabricate, 18 W. NEW ENGL. L. REV. 541, 550-51 (1996).
6. Nancy E. Snow, Evaluating Rape Shield Laws: Why the Law Continues to Fail
Rape Victims, in A MOST DETESTABLE CRIME: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE
255-56 (Keith Burgess-Jackson ed., 1999) [hereinafter A MOST DETESTABLE CRIME]
(asserting that "[v]ictims of other kinds of crime need not open their private lives to public
scrutiny in order to press their claims"); see TASLITZ, supra note 5 (stating that one of the
primary differences between rape and other crimes was that rape needed to be proven
through corroboration); Deborah W. Denno, Perspectives on Disclosing Rape Victims'
Names, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1113, 1113-14 (1993) (stating that "[r]ape victims are ...
treated differently than other crime victims by American society and the criminal justice
system").
7. Keith Burgess-Jackson, A History of Rape Law, in A MOST DETESTABLE CRIME,
supra note 6, at 22 (arguing that in many cases, rape victims are forced during the trial to
prove that they did not consent to sexual intercourse). In jurisdictions where non-consent
is an element of the crime of rape, most rape trials are reduced to an examination of the
issue of consent. Id. The focus of the trial becomes the defendant's word against that of
the victim. This forces the victim to "defend" her actions and thus effectively serves to put
the victim on trial. Id.; Anne M. Coughlin, Sex & Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 8 (1998). Rape
is rooted in the crimes of fornication and adultery. See id. Because non-marital sexual
intercourse was historically deemed to be a crime, acts of sexual intercourse outside the
bounds of marriage were severely punished. Id. at 8 & n.23. In order for a woman to
rebut an accusation of fornication or adultery, and thus avoid criminal punishment, the
woman had three possible defenses. She could claim either that she did not commit the
act, that she lacked the requisite state of mind to commit such act, or that she participated
while under duress. Id. at 8. A woman could prove the latter two defenses by claiming
that the acts were forced upon her against her will and without her consent. Id. at 30-45.
An examination of the definition of rape today reveals that the elements of rape are "a
mirror image of the defenses we would expect from women accused of fornication or
adultery." Id. at 8.
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of the roles of women and their sexuality.' As a result, defense attorneys,
in an effort to exonerate their clients, challenge rape victims' testimony
and credibility through an attack on the victims' sexuality.9 Oftentimes,
the defense attorney's attack forces rape victims to justify their own
behavior.'0 The criminal justice system does not require victims of other
crimes to justify their actions in the same manner."
Prior to the enactment of rape shield statutes came the realization that
certain information revealed about the victim at trial, such as past sexual
history, effectively "[put] the rape victim ... on trial.' ' 2 Because a rape
8. See GREGORY M. MATOESIAN, LAW AND THE LANGUAGE OF IDENTITY:
DISCOURSE IN THE WILLIAM KENNEDY SMITH RAPE TRIAL 39 (2001). Matoesian argues
that rape is based on a paternalistic conception of sexuality.
Contrary to popular belief, the rape trial ... does not determine if there were
consent or nonconsent, force or lack of force, from an individual woman's or
man's point of view. Nor does it determine consent or nonconsent from gender-
neutral criteria governing the interpretation of sexual desire, applying co-equally
to normative sexual preferences of men and women. Instead, the rape trial
determines if the female consented to arbitrary yet misrecognized male standards
of sexuality. If a woman had sex with the man before, if she were intoxicated, if
she kissed him, if she was out until the early morning hours, if she went to his
apartment or home, if she had found him attractive or interesting, if he were an
acquaintance, date, or friend, then the woman has, to varying degrees, consented
to scxual access. Her actions align with male-centered criteria-male values ....
Id.; Snow, supra note 6, at 254; Alice Vachss, The Charge of Rape, the Force of Myth,
WASH. POST, November 2, 2003, at B2.
9. See Snow, supra note 6, at 255; TASLITZ, supra note 5 (asserting that "[t]he
victim's prior sexual conduct was relevant, both to impeach her credibility (tramps lie) and
to make her consent more likely").
10. See TASLITZ, supra note 5.
11. See Snow, supra note 6, at 254.
12. Burgess-Jackson, supra note 7; see Snow, supra note 6, at 252. Snow critiques the
method in which criminal defense attorneys "attacked" rape victims during cross-
examination before the enactment of rape shield statutes.
What happened to complainants on the witness stand before the advent of rape
shield laws was planned moral abuse. Defense attorneys pried into the sexual
past of victims with the intent of impugning their moral character. Questions
were not cast in neutral terms but were loaded with insulting innuendo. Defense
attorneys sought to connect complainants with the use of alcohol and drugs, "fast
living," unfit motherhood, poor employment records, and other lapses generally
deemed morally undesirable by society. "Character assassination" is not too
strong a phrase. The point, however, was not just to smear the victim's character,
thereby subverting her credibility and moral worth as a person, but to establish,
if possible, the "contributory fault of the victim." Engaging in certain activities,
such as drinking or dancing with the defendant, hitchhiking, or wearing certain
kinds of clothes, shows that the victim "had it coming," that she was "asking for
it," and that she "got what she deserved." Moreover, portraying the complainant
as morally unsympathetic and essentially different from jurors was meant to
block the possibility that members of the jury would compassionately identify
with the victim's plight and thereby incline to render a verdict in her favor.
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trial imposes burdens on victims that do not exist in the prosecution of
other crimes, rape victims need heightened protection during the trial
process. Based on this need, and as a means of eliminating negative
treatment of the victim, state and federal legislatures have adopted rape
shield statutes to prevent information concerning a victim's past sexual
behavior from being introduced at trial.
4
Although rape shield statutes are effective in the courtroom, they do
not prevent the media from publicizing damaging information about the
victim throughout the trial process. 5 The effect of such media exposure
on potential jurors is considerable. 6 Media coverage allows potential
jurors an opportunity to formulate biased opinions about the victim
before the trial commences, thereby invading the victim's right to
privacy. 7 Regardless of whether such information is prevented from
introduction in court, the jury may have already heard it." In order to
protect victims' privacy and to provide rights to victims of crime, most
states have enacted victims' rights statutes.' 9 Additionally, thirty-two
Id.; see TASLITZ, supra note 5 (asserting that "rape differed from other crimes because the
law 'focus[ed] on the character and behavior of the victim rather than on the behavior of
the offender"').
13. See Burgess-Jackson, supra note 7, at 23.
14. Snow, supra note 6, at 245.
The purposes of [rape shield statutes] are threefold: to protect the rape victim
from humiliating and intimidating cross-examination about her sexual conduct;
to prevent judges and juries from being prejudiced by sexual history evidence
that might have little probative value; and to encourage the reporting of rape by
making the victim's in-court experience less grueling and degrading.
Id.
15. See Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual
Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 51, 56 (2002) (stating that
"[r]ape shield laws were designed to protect rape victims from the public exposure of their
private sexual lives at trial").
16. See Mercy Hermida, Trial by Tabloid, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 197, 204 (1994)
(asserting that "the average individual may enter the deliberation room believing that the
inadmissible evidence was valuable evidence that was merely thrown out on a
technicality").
17. Id. ("[E]xtensive pretrial publicity . . . allow[s] potential jurors to consider
evidence that either is not true or is inadmissible at trial.").
18. Id. at 203 ("Potential jurors may arrive at the courthouse on the first day of the
trial with extensive knowledge about the victim .... "); Vachss, supra note 8 (stating that
"the danger in every sexual assault prosecution is that the result has been determined
before the jury is seated").
19. FRANK J. WEED, CERTAINTY OF JUSTICE: REFORM IN THE CRIME VICTIM
MOVEMENT 22 (1995) (stating that the rights provided for by many of these statutes are
very similar to those contained in a victims' rights bill).
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states have incorporated victims' rights amendments into their
constitutions.20
Victims' rights statutes prohibit the media from publishing the name or
identity of crime victims,2' whereas victims' rights amendments guaranteeS • 22
certain rights to crime victims through state constitutions. Despite
these protections, inadequacies remain in victims' rights statutes.
23 For
example, many of these statutes are not specific to rape victims;2 4 the
majority of statutes focus on the rights of crime victims generally.
25
General statutes pose a problem to rape victims because such statutes do
20. ALA. CONST. amend. 557; ALASKA CONST. art. I., § 24; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, §
2.1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 16a; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 8; FLA.
CONST. art. 1, § 16(b); IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 22; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1; IND. CONST.
art. 1, § 13(b); KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 15; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 25; MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS
Art. 47; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 24; MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 26-A; MO. CONST. art. 1, § 32;
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 8; N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 22; N.M. CONST.
art. 1I, § 24; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37; OHIO CON5T. art. I, § 10a; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 34;
OREG. CONST. art. 1, § 42; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 23; TENN. CONST.
art. 1, 35; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 30; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28, VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A;
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 9m.
21. Michelle Johnson, Of Public Interest: How Courts Handle Rape Victims' Privacy
Suits, 4 COMM. L. & Pol'Y 201, 211 (1999) (stating that "[n]early all of these laws attempt
to shield victims by preventing the press from obtaining their names"). A few states
protect the identities of rape victims through rape-specific victims' rights statutes. Id. at
211 & n.51. Other states protect the identities of crime victims in general through state
laws. Id. In the vast majority of states, however, victims' rights statutes do not protect
victims' identities. Rather, most victims' rights statutes afford crime victims "increased
rights within the criminal justice process" and serve to "reintegrate victims into the
criminal justice system in a manner that recognizes their legitimate concerns .... " Mary
Margaret Giannini, Note, The Swinging Pendulum of Victims' Rights: The Enforceability
of Indiana's Victims' Rights Laws, 34 IND. L. REV. 1157, 1157, 1167 (2001). Such rights,
among many, may include entitlement to restitution or reparations and the right to be
informed of all judicial proceedings relating to the alleged crime. See UTAH CODE ANN. §
77-37-3(1)(e), (i) (2004). Throughout this Comment, any discussion of victims' rights
statutes that protect victims' identities from media disclosure should be understood as
referencing rape-specific victims' rights statutes.
22. Jennifer J. Stearman, An Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to
Protect the Rights of Crime Victims: Exploring the Effectiveness of State Efforts, 30 U.
BALT. L.F. 43, 48-50 (1999) (discussing the states that have adopted victims' rights
amendments and the types of rights they confer on crime victims).
23. See Berlin, supra note 3, at 515, 520, 525-26. Many states did not adopt victims'
rights statutes, not to mention rape specific statutes, because they "prefer[red] to allow the
media to police themselves in the hope that media indiscretions w[ould] be few so as not
to damage state interests." Id. at 526.
24. See WEED, supra note 19; Berlin, supra note 3, at 525-26.
25. See WEED, supra note 19 (noting that the rights conferred on victims by many
victims' rights statutes are very similar to those protected by victims' rights amendments).
Like many victims' rights amendments, most victims' rights statutes speak of crime victims
generally. The Utah victims' right statute is an example. See § 77-37-3 (creating a general
bill of rights for victims of all crimes).
302 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 54:297
not take into account the unique obstacles rape victims face both before
21and during the rape trial. In addition, they do not prohibit publicizing
information about the victim, such as past sexual history, outside of the
courtroom setting.
The concern for victims' privacy evidenced in the victims' rights
statutes clashes with the media's assertion of freedom of the press under
the First Amendment.2 As a result of this conflict, courts have
invalidated such statutes as an unconstitutional infringement on freedom
of the press.29 In certain cases, courts have held victims' rights statutes
26. See Snow, supra note 6, at 255. Snow discusses the victim's "second rape" during
cross-examination.
[T]he kind of cross-examination that victims were (and are) forced to undergo
during trial is similar to rape. Thus, some commentators refer to the victim's trial
experience as a "second victimization." Both rape and cross-examination
involve invasions of the victim's autonomy. Rape, of course, is a physical, as well
as a mental and emotional, violation of the victim's autonomy. Rape denies the
victim's autonomy and implies a negative judgment of her value. It is a morally
objectionable objectification of the victim .... The rapist's total disregard of the
victim's desires reduces her to the status of a tool or instrument. Similarly, the
defense attorney's disregard of the victim's privacy, his indifference to truth, and
his relative lack of concern with justice contribute to his treatment of the victim
as a means to the end of securing his client's acquittal, thus reinforcing the
hegemony of patriarchy.
Id.
27. Since rape-specific victims' rights statutes protect only very limited information
about the victim from public disclosure, conceivably general victims' rights statutes
provide even less protection. See Berlin, supra note 3, at 520 (stating that "[t]he type and
amount of information protected under typical privacy statutes for sexual assault victims is
specific and limited"); see also Giannini, supra note 21 (noting that the goal of general
victims' rights statutes is to afford victims of crime rights in the criminal justice system).
28. See id. at 515 ("The conflict between press freedoms and individuals' privacy
rights has not yet been settled satisfactorily."); Paul Gewirtz, Privacy and Speech, 2001
Sup. CT. REV. 139, 139-40 (2001). Gewirtz examines the delicate balance between
freedom of speech and the right to privacy.
Although the tension between speech and privacy is hardly a new one, it has
expanding significance. New technologies have opened up wonderful new
possibilities for communication and expression, but also have created ominous
new possibilities for diminution of privacy. Any breach in privacy, of course, can
be greatly magnified if the media discloses it to the public-and the public's
appetite for information about other people's private matters, and the media's
willingness to satisfy that appetite, have never been greater. These and other
developments have underscored the vulnerability of privacy and have created
new concerns about the balance between free speech and privacy.
Id.
29. See, e.g., State v. Globe Communications Corp., 648 So. 2d 110, 111 (Fla. 1994)
(holding that the Globe received information about the victim through lawful standards of
investigation and therefore the victims' rights statute was facially invalid under both the
U.S. and Florida Constitutions); Dye v. Wallace, 553 S.E.2d 561, 562 (Ga. 2001) (holding
that Georgia's rape confidentiality statute violated both the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution).
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generally inapplicable, viewing the public's right to be informed as more
important than the privacy of the victim."' Thus, courts vehemently
protect the public's "right to know" at the expense of a victim's right to
privacy."
Invalidating victims' rights statutes as unconstitutional impedes the
legislative goal of ensuring a victim's right to privacy in the face of
extensive media coverage.32 In contrast to courts' unwillingness to
protect the privacy rights of victims, courts have been eager to uphold
the defendant's right to a fair trial.33 The Sixth Amendment guarantees
criminal defendants the right to a trial by an impartial jury.34 Courts
consider this guarantee one of the most important rights in the
Constitution. 3  However, no special protection exists for crime victims
under the Constitution. 36 As a result, courts implement a wide array of
30. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532-33 (1989) (holding that it would be against
the newspaper's First Amendment rights for the courts to impose sanctions under the
victims' rights statute since the newspaper received the information through lawful
means); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1975) (holding that the
imposition of civil sanctions, pursuant to Georgia's victims' rights statute, on a newspaper
for publishing the name of a rape victim impermissibly infringed on the newspaper's right
to freedom of the press); Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 474-75 (Tex. 1995)
(stating that the newspaper did not violate the rape victim's right to privacy by revealing
information about her identity and holding that the burden would be too great on the
media if the court forced newspapers to examine every piece of information they disclosed
because it could potentially identify the victim).
31. Johnson, supra note 21, at 205 (stating that "the courts generally seem to agree
that media coverage of crime and courts is in the public interest and such coverage should
be as complete as possible").
32. See Patrick J. McNulty, The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There is Life After
Florida Star, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 93, 116 (2001) (stating that the Florida Star decision
"amounts to judicial overkill" and destroys the public disclosure tort that protects victims'
privacy rights).
33. E.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) (holding that televising the trial
unconstitutionally infringed on the defendant's right to a fair trial); see also Federated
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Swedberg, 633 P.2d 74, 77-8 (Wash. 1981) (finding that requiring members
of the media to agree to bench-bar-press guidelines was not a violation of the media's
freedom of the press right and was necessary to protect the accused's right to a fair trial).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WILLIAM A. KAPLIN, THE CONCEPTS AND METHODS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 137 (1992). Through the incorporation doctrine of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment applies equally to the states. Id.
35. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1031 (1991) (stating that "[flew
interests under the Constitution are more fundamental than the right to a fair trial by
impartial jurors"); see also Estes, 381 U.S. at 540 (asserting that "[wie have always held
that the atmosphere essential to the preservation of a fair trial-the most fundamental of
all freedoms-must be maintained at all costs").
36. Johnson, supra note 21, at 209; see Kathleen Kalaher, Note, The Proposed
Victim's Rights Amendment: Taking a Bite out of Crime or a Dog with no Teeth?, 22
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 317, 323 (1997) (commenting that "[t]he United States
Constitution does not explicitly or implicitly contain procedural rights for victims").
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procedural devices to ensure the defendant's right to a fair trial.37 This is
especially true in high-profile cases that entail considerable publicity.
In such cases, courts take great pains to accommodate celebrity
defendants and to protect their constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair
trial.'9
The criminal justice system exerts a bias in favor of rich and famous
defendants. °  Wealth allows the defendant greater access to legal
resources,4' which can prove to be superior to those of state or county
prosecutors. 2 Most importantly, celebrity status affords the defendant
an opportunity to present the case to the public, with the help of the
media, before going to trial.43
This Comment examines the impact of media coverage on rape shield
laws in high-profile cases. Specifically, this Comment examines whether
the media deprives rape victims in such cases of a ."fair trial" when
personal information regarding the victim, including past sexual
behavior, is disclosed. First, this Comment discusses historical
perspectives on rape and the evolution of rape shield laws in response to
patriarchal views of rape victims. Second, this Comment examines
victims' rights statutes, as they serve to complement rape shield laws.
Third, this Comment examines the conflict between a victim's right to
privacy and the media's First Amendment right to freedom of the press.
It also discusses how courts have resolved this conflict. Fourth, this
Comment addresses the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair
trial in the context of intense media coverage. Fifth, this Comment
examines procedural devices utilized by courts to ensure that defendants
37. Stephen, supra note 3, at 1083-1091 (noting the procedural devices courts may
implement, including restraining orders, postponement, change of venue, change of
venire, voir dire, jury sequestration, jury instructions, mistrial, as well as "miscellaneous
devices"); Jaime N. Morris, Note, The Anonymous Accused Protecting Defendants' Rights
in High-Profile Criminal Cases, 44 B.C. L. REV. 901, 903 (2003) (stating that such
procedural devices may include gag orders, prior restraints, voir dire, special jury
instructions, jury sequestration, postponement, and change of venue).
38. Stephen, supra note 3, at 1080-81 ("In such [high-profile] cases, the trial court
should not hesitate to creatively and thoroughly use a combination of various devices.").
39. See id. at 1082 ("The court must maintain impartiality by continuously and
carefully monitoring the trial proceedings and any outside activity that may prejudice
jurors.").
40. See Robinson, supra note 1, at 1330. Although it is generally arguable that
celebrity defendants receive preferential treatment in criminal cases, it is also significant to
note that the media has made examples of some celebrity defendants, especially in the
context of professional sports, by "singl[ing] [them] out as sacrificial lambs." Id. at 1313.
41. Peter Arenella, Foreword: O.J. Lessons, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1234-36 (1996).
42. Id. at 1235-36.
43. Id. at 1236 ("The prosecutor's task becomes even harder when he has charged a
celebrity defendant whose advantages extend far beyond his ability to battle the
prosecution on an even playing field in the courtroom.").
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receive a fair trial and explores the lack of remedies available to rape
victims. Sixth, this Comment discusses the impact of affluence and
celebrity status on criminal trials and the bias inherent in the criminal
justice system in favor of wealthy defendants. Further, this Comment
argues that when the media discloses private information about the
victim's past, it invalidates the effectiveness of rape shield statutes, thus
depriving the victim of a "fair trial." Finally, this Comment proposes
that state constitutions need to include rape-specific amendments as a
means of ensuring that rape victims receive a "fair trial."
I. RAPE VICTIMS AND CELEBRITY DEFENDANTS IN THE MEDIA:
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES
A. Historical Perspectives on Rape
The crime of rape originated as a property offense. 44 Because ancient
societies viewed women as chattel,45 laws punished men not for the
offense committed against a particular woman, but rather for unlawfully
46
taking another man's property. As societies evolved and formulated
more complex legal systems, the crime of rape was seen less as a crime
against property and more as a violent sexual offense.47 Notwithstanding
44. Burgess-Jackson, supra note 7, at 16-17; JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW § 33.03[A][1] (2001).
45. Burgess-Jackson, supra note 7, at 16; DRESSLER, supra note 44.
46. Burgess-Jackson, supra note 7, at 16-17. Ancient law considered a woman to be
the property of her father or husband. Id. at 16; Patricia Smith, Social Revolution and the
Persistence of Rape, in A MOST DETESTABLE CRIME, supra note 6, at 32-33. Smith
discusses the historical view of women as property.
There is no question that before the 19 "h century the crime of rape was a crime
against men (as owners of their wives and daughters). This was demonstrated by
many legal policies. One common one, for example, was that a man charged
with rape (which was, like horse thievery, a capital offense) could exonerate
himself by marrying his victim and paying her father a sum equal to her
estimated value on the marriage market (so to speak). This suggests that women
were viewed more or less like valuable livestock or perhaps uniquely prized
possessions. Women, especially virgins, were very valuable property. But since
their value was conditioned on their sexual purity, they could be very easily
ruined, and consequently required strict and careful guarding. This produced the
dual male role of predator and protector of the female prey, all of which has
survived in many subtle forms, even though the idea of women as property has
declined.
Id.
47. Burgess-Jackson, supra note 7, at 16-17. In contrast, Saxon laws did not consider
rape to be a violent offense; rather, it treated rape as a crime of passion. Id. at 17. Thus,
although rape began as an offense punishable by death, the penalty was reduced to
"'castration and loss of [the] eyes."' Id. Contra id. at 94. Some scholars argue that
"coercion," rather than violence, "lies at the heart of rape." Id.
2004]
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such changes in the classification of rape, the law still placed an onerous
burden on the woman.48 In order to successfully prosecute a defendant
accused of rape, the woman had to prove that she had in fact been raped
against her will.4 9 Thus, the woman's behavior, rather than the physical
acts committed by the defendant, became the focus of the rape.5° The
responsibility of proving such a heavy burden served effectively to place
the rape victim on trial.si
Since its inception, the American legal system has imposed similar
burdens on the victim. 52 For example, many jurisdictions required the
victim to prove that intercourse was non-consensual. 3  A significant
48. See id at 16-18. Medieval canon law required the rape victim to cry out against
the perpetrator to prove lack of consent, although it did not require a showing of
strenuous resistance. Id. at 17.
49. See id. at 16-18.
50. TASLITZ, supra note 5. Further, the victim's past sexual history became
important in discrediting the victim's testimony and in serving to prove the victim's
consent. Id.
51. Burgess-Jackson, supra note 7.
52. DRESSLER, supra note 44, § 33.04[B][1][a]. At common law, a victim had to
prove that the sexual assault occurred forcibly, against the victim's will, and without
consent. Id. Some jurisdictions further required that a third party testify at trial to
corroborate the victim's story. Id. § 33.07[A]; see Stacy Futter & Walter R. Mebane, Jr.,
The Effects of Rape Law Reform on Rape Case Processing, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.
72, 74-75 (2001). Futter and Mebane discuss the traditional definition of rape.
The traditional common law definition of rape is "unlawful carnal knowledge of
a woman by force and against her will." The common law definition of rape was
prevalent throughout the United States until the mid-1950s and remained the law
of many states through the mid-1970s. Under the common law definition, in
order for a sexual assault to be considered rape, there had to have been "forcible
penetration of the vagina by the penis, however slight." Rape only included
assaults by a male perpetrator on a female victim and exempted a husband from
being charged with a crime against his wife ....
Traditional rape law centered around the woman's consent. It required the
victim to prove that her resistance was truly overcome and that the rape really
occurred "against her will." In many cases a victim had to prove that she
"resisted to the utmost" before she was raped. (citations omitted)
Id.
53. DRESSLER, supra note 44, § 33.04[B][1J[a]. Basing the definition of rape on the
concept of consent presents several difficulties.
[I]f consent is to be a meaningful expression of a person's interests and desires,
then the consent must be granted under conditions in which that person was free
from coercive pressures to grant or to withhold her consent. Under conditions in
which sexualized violence is common, it is going to be difficult to determine
whether or not a woman's consent is truly free. Moreover, making rape hinge on
nonconsent, when many women know that they did consent, albeit under more
or less coercive circumstances ... contribute[s] to the underreporting of all rapes,
acquaintance rape in particular. Partly in response to this state of affairs, a
number of feminist reformers have called for moving the standard of
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portion of these jurisdictions also obligated the victim to demonstrate
resistance to the alleged rape.54 Although many of these burdens have
been substantially reduced, some continue to exist within the trial
process.5 As a result of the continued burden placed on rape victims,
rape law reformers have struggled, and continue to struggle, with how to
define the crime of rape."
During the past thirty years, state legislatures, with the assistance of
the women's movement, have recognized the need to transform the
nature of the rape trial.57 As a result, they have worked to change the
noncoercive sex away from consent toward something approximating
"mutuality" between the parties.
Jeffrey A. Gauthier, Consent, Coercion, and Sexual Autonomy, in A MOST DETESTABLE
CRIME, supra note 6, at 71-72.
54. DRESSLER, supra note 44, § 33.04[B][l][a],[c]; Coughlin, supra note 7, at 14.
Coughlin further discusses the evolving definition of rape in regard to the physical
resistance requirement.
After years of lobbying, members of the rape reform movement have persuaded
lawmakers to modify, but certainly not eliminate, the physical resistance
requirement. At least one jurisdiction continues to hold that a rape occurs only
in cases where the woman offers "earnest resistance" to sexual intercourse. Most
others demand proof that the woman physically opposed the man, though
something short of her utmost effort now is satisfactory. The critics offer a
number of objections to the resistance requirement, even in its current relaxed
form. For one thing, the requirement exposes women to the risk of serious
physical injury: Many women lack the physical strength, fighting expertise, or
psychological inclination to subdue a male attacker, and, while the question is
not free from doubt, there are empirical data suggesting that victim resistance
may incite some rapists to behave more violently than they otherwise would.
Id. at 14-16.
55. See Snow, supra note 6, at 255 (asserting that cross-examination continues to
impose burdens on the victim because "the kind of cross-examination that victims were
(and are) forced to undergo during trial is similar to rape").
56. Gauthier, supra note 53, at 71 (acknowledging that feminists, in an effort to
reform rape law, struggle over how to define the crime of rape).
57. LISA M. CUKLANZ, RAPE ON TRIAL: HOW THE MASS MEDIA CONSTRUCT
LEGAL REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 31 (Mary Ellen Brown & Andrea Press eds.,
1996). Cuklanz comments on the attempts undertaken by reformers to change the nature
of the rape trial.
The reformers' efforts centered on the assertions that the crime of rape could be
adjudicated by a jury just as other felonies were; that because women were not
pathological liars and their social roles had changed, the incentives to invent a
fictional rape were much less significant than the incentives to conceal that it had
occurred; and that women did not cause rape through their behavior, dress,
attitudes, or reputations. They argued that the same rules used to judge the
credibility of witnesses of other felonies could be used in rape cases. They also
argued that rapists could not be identified by their race or class affiliations but by
the testimony of their victims, that rapists were not necessarily strangers to their
victims, and that rape was a crime of violence. In short, reformers offered a
coherent set of beliefs that directly contradicted and were intended to replace
traditional views.
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focus of the rape trial from the victim's private life to the actions taken
by the defendant during the offense.58 Even though state and federal
legislative reforms have not entirely eliminated the negative treatment
experienced by rape victims during the trial process, tremendous strides
have been made toward creating a just judicial system for rape victims.
5 9
The enactment of rape shield statutes represents one such reform
measure arising out of this legislative effort. 60
B. Rape Shield Statutes
In general, rape shield statutes prevent the disclosure of information
61
about a victim's sexual history during trial. State and federal
legislatures believed that such laws were necessary to protect the victim
62
from being treated as the guilty party. An example of such treatment is
cross-examination, which allows rape victims to be treated as if they are
on trial. 63 Due to this unfair treatment, rape victims need heightened
protection during the trial process. 64 Although cross-examination is not
unique to rape victims, attorneys use cross-examination to treat rape
victims differently than victims of other crimes.65 Because "[r]ape is a
sensitive crime of a sexual nature," 66 private, intimate details about the
Id. at 31-32; see Snow, supra note 6, at 245. Feminist reformers have played an
instrumental role in effectuating changes in rape laws and in the trial process encountered
by rape victims. See id. at 246-47.
58. See Snow, supra note 6. An argument exists that crime victims in general and
rape victims in particular have a "constitutionally guaranteed right to a zone of privacy,"
which should be recognized during cross-examination. Id. at 256.
59. Burgess-Jackson, supra note 7, at 21.
60. See Sakthi Murthy, Comment, Rejecting Unreasonable Sexual Expectations:
Limits on Using a Rape Victim's Sexual History to Show the Defendant's Mistaken Belief in
Consent, 79 CAL. L. REV. 541, 551 (1991) (stating that legislatures enacted rape shield
statutes to satisfy "five basic purposes").
61. Snow, supra note 6, at 245.
62. Anderson, supra note 15, at 88. Rape shield statutes also encourage victims to
report when they have been raped. Id.
63. See Burgess-Jackson, supra note 7.
64. See David K. Reinert, Note, Rape Shield: Immigrants Deserve the Same Protection
We Give Our Citizens, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 355, 370-71 (2004) (noting
that both bodies of Congress approved the federal rape shield statute with little dissent as
a means of remedying "the perceived unfair treatment of [rape] victims on the witness
stand"); see also Burgess-Jackson, supra note 7, at 23 (acknowledging that "some radicals"
advocate providing rape victims with the same constitutional rights as those enjoyed by
defendants).
65. See Snow, supra note 6, at 256 (stating that "[t]ypes of gender cases other than
rape-for example sexual abuse, sexual harassment, and sex discrimination cases-show
the same unequal power dynamics of cross-examination"). Unlike victims of other crimes,
cross-examination places a "special burden" on rape victims, which allows public scrutiny
of their lives. Id. at 255.
66. Id at 253.
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victim's life take on added significance." Some defense attorneys,
through cross-examination of rape victims, endeavor to introduce
evidence about the victim's past sexual behavior in an effort to discredit
the victim's testimony.68 This evidence also is used to create reasonable
doubt in the minds of the jurors as to the defendant's culpability and to
question the victim's willingness to participate in the sexual act alleged to
be rape.6' As a result of this treatment of rape victims, cross-
examinations have been described as a "second rape., 7  Rape shield
statutes serve as a means of protecting the victim from this "second
rape.",
71
Nearly every state has in place one of four different types of rape
shield statutes.72 The four types of statutes fall along a spectrum, ranging
from most restrictive to least restrictive.7 ' The most restrictive type
allows evidence of past sexual behavior to be introduced at trial only
under two very specific circumstances. 4 Evidence will be admissible if it
either relates to the "victim's past sexual conduct" with the defendant, or
if it concerns "specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or
origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease.,
75
In contrast, the least restrictive type of rape shield statute allows trial
judges to exercise broad discretion in determining whether information
relating to the victim's past sexual behavior will be admitted. 7' Evidencerelating to a victim's reputation, however, is not admissible.
67. Id. at 253-54.
68. Id. at 252.
69. Id. at 252-53.
70. ANN J. CAHILL, RETHINKING RAPE 111 (2001); Snow, supra note 6, at 255.
Snow argues that the rape trial serves to effectively humiliate and "re-rape" the victim.
In effect, the victim is a tool not just of the rapist, but also of the defense
attorney. In order to get his "win," defense counsel is willing to "re-rape."
Invasions of privacy are central to the re-rape of the victim. Attempts to
demean or humiliate a victim are most potent when attached to facts of the
victim's life. Cross-examination to elicit irrelevant sexual history evidence
violates the victim's moral right to privacy, construed as the right to control the
dissemination of information about her private life.
Id.
71. Reinert, supra note 64.
72. DRESSLER, supra note 44, § 33.07[B]; Anderson, supra note 15, at 81.
73. Snow, supra note 6, at 247.
74. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j(1)(a), (b) (West 1991).
75. Id. The trial judge retains discretion in determining if the evidence is overly
prejudicial. If the "prejudicial nature ... outweigh[s] its probative value," the trial judge
may deem the evidence inadmissible. Id.
76. See Gregory M. Matoesian, Language, Law and Society: Policy Implications of the
Kennedy Smith Rape Trial, 29 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 669, 673 (1995) (indicating that "some
states (such as Texas and Georgia) implemented weak or permissive shield laws in which
2004]
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The federal statute, which is codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence,
represents the third type of rape shield statute.78 It disallows the
introduction of evidence relating to the victim's past sexual behavior with
three exceptions 8.7  As with the most restrictive type of statute, the
defendant may offer evidence of "sexual behavior" between the victim
and the defendant to prove consent.80 Likewise, evidence pertaining to
"specific instances of sexual behavior" will be deemed admissible "to
prove that a person other than the accused was the source of semen,
injury or other physical evidence."'g The federal statute, however, also
allows the introduction of evidence if its exclusion would otherwise
81infringe on the defendant's constitutional rights.
Under the fourth type of statute, the court analyzes evidence of past
sexual history in two contexts to determine admissibility: consent of the
victim and credibility of the victim.13 The judge has the discretion to
84determine within which, if any, context the evidence will be introduced.
These statutes function to prevent information related to the victim's
past sexual conduct from being disclosed during trial. They are,
however, limited in effectiveness to the confines of the courtroom.8 6 For
most rape victims, rape shield statutes serve the function for which they1187
were intended-protecting a victim's privacy during trial. But for
victims caught in the media frenzy, rape shield statutes do not prevent
the media from revealing legally inadmissible information about the
victim to potential jurors.8' Since rape shield statutes do not protect the
victim from such media attention, victims' rights statutes become an
important means for protecting a victim's privacy out of court.89
some sexual history references were potentially relevant to the facts at issue in a case and
likely to be admitted into evidence"); e.g., TEX R. EVID. 412(b), (c).
77. E.g., TEx R. EVID. 412(a). The rule states: "In a prosecution for sexual assault or
aggravated sexual assault ... reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of
an alleged victim of such crime is not admissible." Id.
78. Snow, supra note 6, at 247.
79. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(A), (B).
80. Id. R. 412(b)(1)(B).
81. Id. R. 412(b)(1)(A).
82. Id. R. 412(b)(1)(C).
83. Snow, supra note 6, at 247-48; see, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 782 (West 2004).
84. See Snow, supra note 6, at 247-48 (stating that "[slome of the . . . statutes
following the California approach prohibit substantive evidence, subject to enumerated
restrictions, whereas others prohibit credibility evidence, again, subject to enumerated
restrictions"); see, e.g., § 782.
85. Anderson, supra note 15, at 86, 88.
86. See id. at 56.
87. See Murthy, supra note 60.
88. See Hermida, supra note 16, at 203-04.
89. See Giannini, supra note 21, at 1157.
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C. Victims' Rights Statutes
Since the mid-1980s, several state legislatures have enacted victims'
rights statutes.90 The goal of these statutes is to protect the privacy of
victims by preventing disclosure of their names and information
pertaining to their identities to the public.91 Some state statutes provide
civil damages as a remedy to the victim if the media discloses this929
information,92 while others impose criminal penalties on violators.93 But,
considering the privacy issues at stake, the penalties for both civil and
criminal violations are rather minimal.94
Victims' rights statutes apply either to rape victims specifically or to
crime victims generally.9 The rape-specific statutes do not offer any
more privacy protection, beyond disallowing the publication of a rape
96victim's name or identity, than the general victims' rights statutes.
Florida's statute, for example, which is a rape-specific victims' right
statute, states that media "publication[s] or broadcast[s] may not include
an identifying photograph, an identifiable voice, or the name or address
of the victim."9' The language of this statute, however, does not prevent
the media from publishing information pertaining to the victim's past
sexual history. 9' As long as the media does not reveal the victim's nameor identity, the media is not prohibited from publishing damaging
90. WEED, supra note 19.
91. See supra note 21.
92. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 24C (West 2000) (stating that the
penalty for violation of the statute is a fine "of not less than two thousand five hundred
dollars nor more than ten thousand dollars"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-730 (Law. Co-op.
2003) (reflecting that violation of the statute is a misdemeanor and "punished by a fine of
not more than one thousand dollars or imprisonment of not more than three years").
93. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.3771 (Michie 2001) (recognizing that
violation of the statute constitutes criminal contempt); § 16-3-730 (announcing that a
violator can be imprisoned for up to three years).
94. See ch. 265, § 24C (fining violators "not less than two thousand five hundred
dollars nor more than ten thousand dollars"); § 200.3771 (stating that violators will be
subject to criminal contempt); § 16-3-730 (stating that violators will be fined up to one
thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than three years).
95. Some statutes apply to rape victims specifically. ch. 265, § 24C; § 200.3771; § 16-3-
730. The Utah statute applies generally to crime victims. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-37-3
(2004). The Florida Statute applies generally to sexual offenses, including "act[s] of child
abuse" and "aggravated child abuse." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.56 (West 1999).
96. Compare § 92.56 (disallowing publication of a rape victim's identity, including
photograph, name, and address), ch. 265, § 24C (protecting the confidentiality of a rape
victim's name), § 200.3771 (protecting the identity of rape victims), § 16-3-730 (disallowing
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background information.99 Although such statutes successfully protect
the names and identities of rape victims, they fall short of preventing
disclosure of other information to the public.m°
Also, while victims' rights statutes offer a means of protecting the
identity of rape victims, the judicial response has been somewhat
negative.'"' Courts recognize the tension between the privacy rights
protected by victims' rights statutes and the First Amendment right to
freedom of the press.0 2  The Supreme Court has recognized the
importance of protecting the freedom of the press,' 3 and state courts,
when faced with similar freedom of the press issues, have closely adhered
to Supreme Court precedent.1°4
The trend is clear: when conflicts arise between the privacy rights
protected by victims' rights statutes and the media's freedom of the
press, most state courts find in favor of the media.' 5 As a result, courts
have invalidated victims' rights statutes as unconstitutionally infringing
on the media's First Amendment right."'° This frequently happens when
99. Id.
100. See Berlin, supra note 3, at 520-21.
101. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989) (holding that imposing
damages on a newspaper for publishing the name of a rape victim in contravention of a
state's victims' rights statute violated the First Amendment); State v. Globe
Communications Corp., 648 So. 2d 110, 114 (Fla. 1994) (holding a state victims' rights
statute "facially invalid under ... free speech and free press provisions"); Dye v. Wallace,
553 S.E.2d 561, 562 (Ga. 2001) (holding that Georgia's rape confidentiality statute
"contravene[d] the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution");
Johnson, supra note 21, at 204.
102. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 530 (noting that "[t]he tension between the right which
the First Amendment accords to a free press ... and the protections which various statutes
and common-law doctrines accord to personal privacy . . is a subject we have addressed
several times in recent years"); see Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Tex.
1995) (noting that courts must weigh "the nature of the [private] information and the
public's legitimate interest in its disclosure"); Johnson, supra note 21, at 204.
103. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 530-32 (holding that the imposition of damages on
the newspaper for publishing a rape victim's name violated the First Amendment); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723-24 (1971) (holding that the
government could not use prior restraint to prevent The New York Times from publishing
a classified study about the Vietnam War).
104. Globe Communications Corp., 648 So. 2d at 114 (holding the state's victims' rights
statute "facially invalid under the free speech and free press provisions of both the United
States and Florida Constitutions"); Dye, 553 S.E.2d at 562 (holding that the state's rape
confidentiality statute violated the First Amendment); Star-Telegram, 915 S.W.2d at 474-
75 (holding in favor of the media); see Johnson, supra note 21, at 204.
105. See, e.g., Globe Communications Corp., 648 So. 2d at 114 (holding in favor of the
newspaper); Dye, 553 S.E.2d at 562 (holding in favor of the newspaper); Star-Telegram,
915 S.W.2d at 474-75 (holding in favor of the media); see Johnson, supra note 21, at 204.
106. See, e.g., Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541 (holding that the victims' rights statute
impermissibly infringed on the media's right to publish truthful and lawfully obtained
information); Globe Communications Corp., 648 So. 2d at 114 (holding that the victims'
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the media procures information about the victim through lawful means.10
Regardless of the prohibitions set forth by the particular statute, if the
media has received its information from the police or through other legal
means, courts are unlikely to impose sanctions. The courts are equally
unlikely to impose sanctions even in cases where newspapers disclose
information about a victim that could potentially reveal her identity.0 9
There have been circumstances in which judges have been sympathetic to
the privacy rights of victims."' Typically, however, courts find that
information about the crime, including the victim's identity, is a matter of
public interest and therefore warrants disclosure."'
D. Victims' Rights Amendments
Like victims' rights statutes, victims' rights amendments are another
potential source of protection for rape victims." Victims' rights
amendments are a direct outgrowth of the victim's rights movement. IIn an effort to gain increased rights for crime victims, beyond those
rights statute infringed on the media's freedoms of speech and press); Dye, 553 S.E.2d at
562 (holding that a victims' rights statute violated the First Amendment).
107. See, e.g., Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 532 (noting that the newspaper obtained its
information from a public police report); Globe Communications Corp., 648 So. 2d at 111
(noting that the newspaper got its information about the victim "through standard
investigative techniques").
108. See, e.g., Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 532 (noting that the newspaper obtained its
information from a publicly released police report); Globe Communications Corp., 648 So.
2d at 111 (noting that the newspaper got its information through lawful means).
109. See Star-Telegram, 915 S.W.2d at 474-75 (stating that the newspaper was not
liable for disclosing "[f]acts which do not directly identify an innocent individual but which
make that person identifiable ..." because they were of legitimate public interest). The
Texas Supreme Court determined that the burden would be too great on the media if
courts forced newspapers to examine every piece of information disclosed because it could
potentially identify the victim. Id.
110. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 553. In his dissent, Justice White, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, stated that "[tihere is no public interest in
publishing the names, addresses, and phone numbers of persons who are the victims of
crime...." Id.
111. Carey Haughwout, Prohibiting Rape Victim Identification in the Media: Is it
Constitutional?, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 735, 745 (1992) (stating that "[t]he Supreme Court has
routinely reaffirmed the principle that information concerning the commission of a crime
is a matter of public significance, even where members of a politically important family
have not been implicated or involved"); Johnson, supra note 21, at 204.
112. See supra note 20.
113. Alice Koskela, Victim's Rights Amendments: An Irresistible Political Force
Transforms the Criminal Justice System, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 157, 158 (1997). See generally
Thad H. Westbrook, At Least Treat Us Like Criminals: South Carolina Responds to
Victims' Pleas for Equal Rights, 49 S.C. L. REV. 575, 580 (1998) (stating that the victims'
rights movement was instrumental in securing the ratification of both victims' rights
amendments and statutes).
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provided by victims' rights statutes, victims' rights advocates turned to
state constitutions as a means of providing enhanced rights.1 As a result
of these efforts, thirty-two states have incorporated victims' rights
amendments into their constitutions over the past two decades."5 The
primary purpose of the amendments is to provide constitutional
recognition of crime victims' rights."' To this end, the amendments have
been successful.17
Despite their overall success, victims' rights amendments have not
proven extremely helpful to rape victims. Unlike some victims' rights
statutes, the amendments pertain to victims in general, rather than to
rape victims specifically.'19 The generality of the amendments, therefore,
presents difficulties in defining exactly how rape victims' rights are to be• 1 120
enforced and what remedies are available. For example, the Texas
amendment states that a victim has "the right to be treated with . . .
respect for the victim's dignity and privacy."'' Illinois and Michigan
122adopted virtually the same language in their amendments. Although
all three amendments mention privacy, none elaborate on what privacy
entails. 123 Further, no direct guidelines exist in the amendments as to
how privacy will be protected, nor do the amendments properly define
what constitutes an infringement on privacy.1 4 Therefore, based on the
114. Koskela, supra note 113, at 158-59.
115. See supra note 20.
116. See Giannini, supra note 21, at 1157.
117. See id. at 1162 (discussing the Indiana victims' rights amendment and noting that
"Indiana [crime] victims are afforded rights under the law...").
118. The media continues to invade the privacy interests of rape victims by publishing
information about them, especially in high-profile cases, despite the existence of victims'
rights amendments. See Denno, supra note 6, at 1114.
119. See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 113, at 582. The South Carolina victims' rights
amendment is an example of an amendment "contain[ing] an all-inclusive definition of a
victim so as to include the victim of almost any type of crime." Id.
120. Giannini, supra note 21, at 1167.
121. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30.
122. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1. The Illinois amendment states that "crime victims...
shall have . . . [t]he right to be treated with fairness and respect for their dignity and
privacy." Id.; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24. The language in the Michigan amendment is
identical to the quoted portion of the Illinois amendment. Id.
123. None of the three amendments define the term privacy. See ILL. CONST. art. 1, §
8.1; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30. Some amendments, including those
of Connecticut and Oklahoma, do not mention a right to privacy; they merely require that
victims "be treated with fairness and respect." See CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8(b)(1); OKLA.
CONST. art. 2, § 34 (stating that victims should be "treated with fairness, respect, and
dignity").
124. See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30
(failing to define privacy and giving state legislatures the power to enforce victims' rights
rather than providing direct mechanisms to protect victims' privacy rights).
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language of these amendments, a victim's right to privacy takes on a
more theoretical, rather than practical, application.25
E. Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to a Fair Trial vs. Freedom of the
Press
Unlike the vague protections enumerated in victims' rights
amendments, 126 the Sixth Amendment unambiguously guarantees specific
rights to criminal defendants.' The Sixth Amendment states that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury . .,,12" The right of defendants to
an impartial jury, however, directly conflicts with the freedom of the
press, 9 which allows the media to publish information without fear of
government censure.130 This conflict becomes especially evident in high-
profile cases where the defendant's celebrity status draws considerable
media attention." ' To determine which of these competing constitutional
rights takes precedence in a particular case, the Supreme Court
established a balancing test. 32 The Court weighs the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury against the media's First
125. See CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24;
OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 34; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30 (providing no specific language
defining victims' privacy rights).
126- See CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 24;
OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 34; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30.
127. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
128. Id.
129. See Bruce W. Sanford, No Contest, in COVERING THE COURTS: FREE PRESS,
FAIR TRIALS & JOURNALISTIC PERFORMANCE 3 (Robert Giles & Robert W. Synder eds.,
1999).
130. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also David Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 190 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998)
[hereinafter THE POLITICS OF LAW] (stating that the freedom "to express different
and unpopular views without prior restraint or punishment has gained a unique
acceptance in the United States"); Julia A. Loquai, Keeping Tabs on the Press:
Individual Rights v. Freedom of the Press Under the First Amendment, 16 HAMLINE L.
REV. 447, 448 (1993) (The First Amendment "serves as formidable guardian of the
press' rights to investigate and report on the activities of government and other
matters deemed of public interest.").
131. See Morris, supra note 37, at 901 (stating that "[b]ecause such a highly publicized
atmosphere surrounds potential jurors, these triers of fact may be influenced as to the guilt
or innocence of a high-profile defendant before the trial even begins").
132. See Times-Picayune Publ'g Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301, 1305-06 (1974)
(stating that the media's rights and defendants' rights need to be balanced); see also
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941) (demonstrating that the Court engaged in a
balancing test of the two competing rights-the media's freedom of the press right under
the First Amendment and the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial); Stephen,
supra note 3, at 1091 (explaining that the burden of balancing interests is a heavy one).
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Amendment right of freedom of the press, 33 and whichever right is more
heavily infringed upon is the right that takes precedence in each
particular case.134
Given this clash of rights, courts often hold in favor of the media.
35
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of protecting the
media's right to keep the public informed with minimal government
interference. 36  However, these decisions do not undermine the great
weight the Court places on a defendant's right to a fair trial.3 3 In fact,
the Court has stated that a defendant's right to a fair trial is among one
of the most important constitutional guarantees of all."s Moreover,
courts ardently employ numerous procedural devices in an effort to
protect defendants' rights. 139 In contrast, courts have not shown the same
willingness to balance the rights of victims against the rights of the
media. 140
133. See cases cited supra note 132.
134. See, e.g., Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. at 1308-09 (staying an order placing limitations
on media coverage of trial since alternative means of protecting defendant's right to an
impartial jury were available).
135. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 582-83 (1981) (finding that a television
broadcast of a criminal trial did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights);
Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 97, 103 (Fla. 1979) (per curiam) (holding that the presence of
cameras during trial does not per se violate the due process rights of the defendant); State
v. Newsom, 426 A.2d 68, 72-73 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (finding that radio,
television and still camera footage during a murder trial did not violate the defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights).
136. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980)
("prohibit[ing] government from summarily closing courtroom doors" to the media); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (stating
the "press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship,
injunctions or prior restraints"); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70
(1964) (stating "a profound national commitment to the principal that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open").
137. Stephen, supra note 3, at 1098-99.
138. Id. at 1091-92.
139. See id. at 1081 (stating that in high-profile criminal trials, "the trial court must be
especially assertive in utilizing any devices necessary to ensure a fair trial").
140. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (holding that publishing
lawfully obtained information about a rape victim may only be punished "when narrowly-
tailored to a state interest of the highest order"); State v. Globe Communications Corp.,
648 So. 2d 110, 114 (Fla. 1994) (finding a statute that criminalizes the publication of the
identification of a rape victim to be violative of the First Amendment); Star-Telegram, Inc.
v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 474-75 (Tex. 1995) (finding that the First Amendment protects the
media from liability for publishing information that may indirectly identify a rape victim);
see also Johnson, supra note 21, at 204 (stating "once a new organization learns
information about a public matter, its publication cannot be restricted").
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F. Procedural Devices Employed by Trial Courts to Ensure Defendant's
Sixth Amendment Right in the Face of Excessive Media Coverage
Because protecting a defendant's right to a fair trial is crucial to the
criminal justice system, courts implement various procedural devices to
protect that right. 4' These devices become important in high-profile
cases where extensive media coverage can potentially bias the 
jury.141
One such device is the gag order, which prevents disclosure of facts by
the attorneys, witnesses, and any other parties involved in the case.143 A
second procedural device is voir dire during jury selection.' 44 This device
allows attorneys to screen potential jurors to determine if they hold
preconceived notions about a case or the defendant.145 A third method
implemented by trial courts is a change of venue. 46 If a court determines
that the defendant will be unable to receive a fair trial because of
excessive media coverage, the judge can order the case to be heard in
another jurisdiction. 7  If all other methods fail, the court has
discretionary authority to postpone the trial until media coverage about
the case subsides.1
48
Such procedural devices are not without criticism. 14 The biggest
criticism is that there is no guarantee that the jury will remain unbiased.'5°
Even with the implementation of the aforementioned procedural devices,
the defendant may not receive a fair trial. 5' The media's coverage of the
case may effectively taint the jury pool.' 52 Thus, it is unclear whether
procedural safeguards are an adequate remedy.153
141. Morris, supra note 37, at 903.
142. See Stephen, supra note 3, at 1080-81.
143. Id. at 1084 (stating that gag orders indirectly restrain the media by limiting
potential sources of trial information).
144. Morris, supra note 37, at 910-11; Stephen, supra note 3, at 1087-88.
145. Stephen, supra note 3, at 1087-88.
146. Id. at 1085-86; Morris, supra note 37, at 913-14.
147. Stephen, supra note 3, at 1085-86; Morris, supra note 37, at 913-14.
148. Stephen, supra note 3, at 1085; Morris, supra note 37, at 913.
149. Morris, supra note 37, at 932-33.
150. See id. at 924-932.
151. See id. at 932.
152. Jimmy R. Moye, Comment, The Confluence of Sensationalism and News: Media
Access to Criminal Investigations and the Public's Right to 'Know,' 6 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 89, 95 (1998).
153. Id. at 95-96.
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G. Influence of Wealth and Celebrity Status on the Criminal Justice
System
Although the Supreme Court regards a defendant's right to a fair trial
114as one of the most important rights guaranteed by the Constitution, not
all defendants receive the same treatment.'5 5 In fact, the system favors
rich and famous defendants. 56 Money and notoriety provide celebrities
with unparalleled resources, namely access to highly trained lawyers and
117
extensive legal resources. More importantly, wealth and fame serve as
conduits to the media by providing the defendant with a forum in which
to try or introduce the case to the public before the trial begins.5
II. HIGH-PROFILE VICTIMS ARE BEING DEPRIVED OF A "FAIR TRIAL"
A. The Effect of the Media on Rape Shield Statutes
Rape victims in high-profile cases are not receiving a "fair trial."' 9
The media prevents rape shield statutes from functioning properly.'o
Though the statutes were designed to protect victims during the trial
process and to equalize the playing field between the victim and
defendant, the media has had a direct impact on the statutes'
effectiveness. 6 ' In fact, extensive media coverage focusing on the victim
invalidates rape shield statutes by allowing the jury to hear damaging
information about the victim that would be otherwise inadmissible at
trial.16 Even though such statutes prevent information about the victim's
past sexual behavior from being introduced during trial, they fail to
154. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1031 (1991); Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
155. David Cole, Two Systems of Criminal Justice, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra
note 130, at 410 (noting that "at every stage of the criminal justice system, from
encounters with police.., to appointment of lawyers for the poor.., members of minority
groups and the poor [generally] receive harsher treatment than white people of means").
156. Robinson, supra note 1, at 1330-31 (noting that "athletes' celebrity status ...
allows them to be above the law").
157. Arenella, supra note 41, at 1234 ("Money can have a greater impact on the
verdict than the 'facts' because it dictates how those 'facts' are transformed into legally
admissible and persuasive evidence.").
158. Id. at 1236 (noting that "[f]amous defendants have access to the media to attack
the prosecution's case prior to trial in the court of public opinion").
159. See Vachss, supra note 8.
160. See Hermida, supra note 16.
161. See id. at 204.
162. See id. at 203-04.
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sufficiently prevent jury exposure to such information outside the
courtroom. 163
In order for rape shield statutes to function properly, jurors must be
isolated from potentially damaging information about the victim.'6" In
the face of extensive media coverage, rape shield statutes are powerless
in keeping this type of information from potential jurors.165 Ironically,
this is the precise reason state legislatures, as well as Congress, enacted
rape shield statutes. 66 The legislative intent was to disallow information
about the victim's past sexual behavior from reaching the jury so as not
to raise unfair questions about the victim's culpabilty. The goal of
rape shield statutes is to protect the victim from the risks of a "second
rape" imposed by an unbridled trial process.'6 However, this goal is
subverted because jurors are nonetheless exposed to information that
would otherwise be inadmissible during the trial.169
B. Media Coverage as a "Third Rape" of the Victim
Extensive media coverage serves not only to allow the perpetration of
a "second rape" in the courtroom,'7° but it also imposes a "third rape" on
the victim outside of the trial process. 7  In its desire to sell the news
163. Snow, supra note 6, at 245; Aya Gruber, Pink Elephants in the Rape Trial: The
Problem of Tort-type Defenses in the Criminal Law of Rape, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 203,224-29 (1997).
164. See Hermida, supra note 16, at 203-04.
165. See id.; Stephen, supra note 3, at 1079-80; Berlin, supra note 3; Dan Luzadder &
Greg Gittrich, Accuser OD'd: Pals, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 21, 2003, at C4.
166. Gruber, supra note 163, at 227.
167. Id. at 225-27.
168. See Snow, supra note 6, at 245.
169. See Hermida, supra note 16, at 203-04.
170. See CAHILL, supra note 70; Snow, supra note 6, at 255. Jurors, by way of the
media, become aware of damaging information that they will presumably take with them
into the deliberation room. See Hermida, supra note 16. Jurors could potentially misuse
this information when determining the defendant's guilt or innocence. See id. This
violation of the victim's privacy during the trial itself constitutes the "second rape."
CAHILL, supra note 70. It occurs strictly within the four walls of the courtroom. Snow,
supra note 6, at 255. Cahill defines the "second rape" as follows:
This "second rape" is often formalized in court proceedings, when a witness who
enters cross-examination with complete faith in her own self-understanding
nevertheless finds herself unable to explain why she did certain things or why she
chose to explain them in a certain way. As the victim's increasing prolific
explanation diverges farther and farther from the ideal of self-contained
subjectivity, she appears "beside herself," "hysterical," even to herself.
CAHILL, supra note 70 (quoting Laura Hengehold, An Immodest Proposal: Foucault,
Hysterization, and the "Second Rape," HYPATIA, Summer 1994, at 100); Snow, supra note
6, at 255.
171. Cf Vachss, supra note 8. The author of this Comment posits that a "third rape"
occurs in high-profile cases. The first rape is the physical rape itself. The "second rape"
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story, the media subjects the victim to intense public scrutiny.' Because
society at large, and not merely a room full of jurors, judges the victim,
the "third rape" can damage the victim as much as, if not more than,
either the "second rape" or the actual physical rape itself. 173
In theory, television reports and newspaper articles "re-rape" the
victim on a daily basis.174 Each time the media broadcasts a story about
the victim, it forces the victim to relive the rape." The emotional scars
remain long after the physical markings of the sexual assault disappear.'
6
In fact, the emotional scars may linger a considerable time after the trial
itself because the stories about the victim and the alleged sexual assault
become embedded in the public's memory."'
C. Media Treatment of High-Profile Defendants
In contrast to the treatment that victims receive as a result of extensive
media coverage, high-profile criminal defendants fare considerably
better. 78 Many defendants argue that the media creates bias among
potential jurors, impermissibly infringing upon defendants' right to a fair
trial. 9 However, more often than not, media publicity helps rather than
occurs during cross-examination at trial. Snow, supra note 6, at 255. The "third rape" is
ongoing, occurring when the media inundates the public with information about the
victim. Like the "second rape," the "third rape" is a public, emotional rape of the victim.
Because of the widespread publicity, however, the "third rape" is of significantly larger
magnitude. During this "third rape," the victim is subjected to intense public scrutiny, and
oftentimes, public anger. See Vachss, supra note 8.
172. Stephen, supra note 3 (stating that the media scrutinized the woman who accused
William Kennedy Smith of rape).
173. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
174. Cf Snow, supra note 6, at 255 (stating that "[i]nvasions of privacy are central to
re-rape the victim").
175. Cf id. The effects are similar to defense counsel's cross-examination of the
victim. Id.
176. DRESSLER, supra note 44, § 33.07[C].
177. See Paul Marcus & Tara L. McMahon, Limiting Disclosure of Rape Victims'
Identities, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1020, 1020-21 (1991) (stating that further victimization occurs
when the media widely publicizes rape victims' identities); see Berlin, supra note 3, at 519-
20 ("If [rape] victims' names are publicized, the changes of such embarrassment are only
enhanced.").
178. Compare Vachss, supra note 8 (discussing the public's anger toward the woman
who accused Kobe Bryant of rape), with Arenella, supra note 41, at 1236 (noting most
jurors' reluctance to believe that well-regarded celebrity defendants are capable of
committing heinous crimes).
179. See Andrew G.T. Moore II, The O.J. Simpson Trial-Triumph of Justice or
Debacle?, 41 ST. LOUtS U. L.J. 9, 11 (1996). Many high-profile criminal defendants have
argued:
For there to be an unbiased search for the truth, the fact finder, usually a jury,
should have as little prior knowledge about the case as possible. The rationale
behind the policy is that without prior information, which may taint the process,
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harms celebrity defendants who use the media to their advantage. 8°
Through the media, famous defendants take advantage of the general
public's fascination with fame and wealth to present themselves in a
favorable light."1 More importantly, the media offers famous defendants
the opportunity to "attack the prosecution's case prior to trial in the
court of public opinion. 1 8 2  In cases where the celebrity is highly
regarded by the public before the accusation occurs, the celebrity enjoys
an even greater advantage by using the media to appeal to public. 183
sympathies.
While celebrities have the ability to use the media to their advantage,
victims do not enjoy this same opportunity.'4 As a result, victims find
themselves at the mercy of the media, which can portray the victim in
whatever light will attract the most public attention. 5  Victims are
disadvantaged in two respects. First, the media reveals personal
information about every facet of their lives, typically in a negative light. 86
Second, celebrity defendants, with the assistance of the media, can use
this information to attack the victim's credibility while proclaiming their
the fact finders will be more neutral and better able to render a fair verdict.
However, in this day of mass communication, jurors often know alleged facts
about crimes, suspects and/or defendants well before any evidence is presented
in court. This clearly raises the issue of whether a fair trial is possible in high
profile cases.
Id.; Morris, supra note 37, at 901.
180. See Arenella, supra note 41. But see Wendy Davis, The O.J. Effect, LEGAL AFF.,
Sept.-Oct. 2002, http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/SeptemberOctober2002/scene-davis_
sepoct2002.html. There have been some recent examples where jurors have chosen to
convict high-profile defendants:
Since the Simpson verdict, juries have repeatedly defied the predictions of legal
observers by throwing the book at high-profile defendants: Andrea Yates, the
mentally ill Texas woman who drowned her five children; Louise Woodward, the
Boston nanny convicted in 1997 of killing the baby in her charge; and Marjorie
Knoller and Robert Noel in the San Francisco mauling-dog case. When the
Menendez brothers were retried after Simpson, they were convicted of first-
degree murder. These convictions amount to the opposite of conventional jury
nullification, but they are a related form of defiance.
Id.
181. See Arenella, supra note 41, at 1236.
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. See Stephen, supra note 3. Typically, the media scrutinizes the victims of high-
profile celebrity cases. Id.
185. See Haughwout, supra note 111, at 735; Giampetruzzi, supra note 4, at 153;
Luzadder & Gittrich, supra note 165.
186. See Berlin, supra note 3 at 531-32; Luzadder & Gittrich, supra note 165.
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own innocence. Thus, the media offers celebrity defendants a distinct
advantage over their alleged victims.'8'
Non-celebrity defendants, however, do not enjoy this same
advantage. Since a majority of criminal defendants are indigent, the
opposite is true in many cases. In most criminal trials, some argue,
there is a presumption of the defendant's guilt, which favors of the
prosecution.' In contrast, the jury operates under a heightened
presumption of innocence in cases involving celebrity defendants, who
often use their wealth and fame to "buy" themselves a verdict of
acquittal. 92
The William Kennedy Smith rape trial exemplifies the impact of
celebrity status on the ultimate decision reached by the jury. In 1991,
Patricia Bowman accused Smith, a member of the politically powerful
and well-known Kennedy family, of rape. 93 The media bombarded the
public with information about the defendant, the alleged sexual assault,
and the alleged victim, including her name.' 94 The media also disclosed
information about the victim's promiscuous sexual past.'9
187. See Arenella, supra note 41, at 1236.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 1234-36.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 1236.
192. See Moore, supra note 179, at 23. Orenthal J. Simpson, a former professional
football player, was on trial for the murder of his ex-wife Nicole Brown-Simpson and her
friend, Ronald Goldman. See id. at 9. Because of his wealth and celebrity status, Simpson
was in a position to hire a talented defense team, led by Johnnie Cochran and including F.
Lee Bailey. See id. at 18, 9, 16. One commentator critiques the techniques utilized by
Simpson's defense team:
In the Simpson trial, there were no bounds to the duty of zealous representation.
Under such a formulation, any means justify the end. As a result, we saw
defense counsel "muscling" the judge, the jury and the system, all in the name of
ensuring a fair trial for their client. O.J. Simpson's lawyers, coining themselves
the "dream team," used questionable ethics throughout the trial, For example,
they engaged in three closely related acts of media manipulation to arouse public
anger and sentiment in Simpson's favor. Such conduct obviously was intended to
exert political pressure on the trial judge and prosecution, who are either elected
or appointed officials, to purposefully challenge the very foundations of the
adversarial system of justice.
Id. at 18.
193. MATOESIAN, supra note 8, at 10-13. Patricia Bowman met William Kennedy
Smith after midnight on March 30, 1991, at a bar in West Palm Beach, Florida. Id. at 10.
The two left the bar together in the early morning hours and went to the Kennedy estate,
the location of the alleged rape. Id. at 10-11.
194. See Stephen, supra note 3, at 1079-80; Berlin, supra note 3, at 531.
195. See Jon Sarche, Bryant's Attorneys Reveal Strategy with Request for Records,
WICHITA EAGLE, Sept. 7, 2003, 2003 WL 58428375 (noting that William Kennedy Smith's
defense attorney "hired private investigators to look into Bowman's [the victim's]
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Although it is virtually impossible to gauge the precise impact of this
type of disclosure on the jury, it is conceivable that accounts of the
victim's promiscuity impacted the jury to some degree. 96 In fact, this
information may have been the determining factor in Smith's ultimate
acquittal.' 97 Smith, however, had the added advantage of wealth and the
notoriety of the Kennedy name.' 98 This afforded him the opportunity to
retain a highly respected and talented defense attorney as well as a jury
consultant who selected jurors sympathetic to the defendant9
Like ordinary defendants, celebrity defendants have several
procedural devices at their disposal to protect their constitutional• 200
rights. These devices include gag orders, voir dire, change of venue,
and postponement. 0  Judges willingly implement these devices to
protect defendants' rights.02  The victim, however, regardless of the
extent of media coverage, is not entitled to such procedural devices
because the victim does not have the same constitutional protection as
the defendant. 
2 3
Since the criminal justice system continues to treat rape victims as "co-
defendants," they should be accorded the same constitutional protections
as those guaranteed to criminal defendants.2°4 As a means of protecting
victims' rights, courts should implement devices designed to assure rape
background, obtained medical records and suggested Bowman was mentally disturbed and
promiscuous") (emphasis added).
196. See Hermida, supra note 16, at 202-05; Vachss, supra note 8.
197. Although the jurors deliberated for only seventy-two minutes, all twelve
unanimously decided that Smith should be acquitted within five minutes of reaching the
deliberation room. MATOESIAN, supra note 8, at 30; Hermida, supra note 16, at 203.
198. See MATOESIAN, supra note 8, at 9. This case was unique in that the alleged
victim, Patricia Bowman, also came from a wealthy family. Id. at 10. Her stepfather was
able to hire the most prestigious law firm in the area to offer assistance in a variety of
capacities to the state prosecuting attorney on her behalf. Id. at 13.
199. See id. at 20-21, 25. Roy Black led Smith's defense team. At the time of the trial,
Black was forty-six years old, and he was regarded as one of the most talented defense
attorneys in the country. id. at 20-21. The jury consultant, "Cat" Bennett, advised Black
to select six conservative, Republican jurors in the hopes that the jurors would not believe
the alleged victim's story. Id. at 25, The strategy worked because all twelve jurors
acquitted Smith. Id.
200. Stephen, supra note 3, at 1080-81.
201. Id. at 1083; Morris, supra note 37, at 903.
202. See Morris, supra note 37, at 903.
203. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing the defendant's, rather than the
victim's, right to an impartial jury); cf Giannini, supra note 21, at 1168. Even though
victims' rights amendments guarantee certain rights to victims, "victims cannot exercise
their rights where doing so would 'infringe upon the constitutional rights of the accused."'
Id. (quoting IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b)).
204. Burgess-Jackson, supra note 7, at 23.
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victims a "fair trial., 2 5 Until then, the victim may inadvertently benefit
from procedural devices implemented on behalf of the defendant.2 6 For
instance, a rape victim could conceivably benefit from a change in
venue. 20 7 If publicity has been considerably less in the new venue, both
the defendant and the victim benefit because the likelihood of juror bias
decreases to some degree. However, the victim is not intended as the
primary beneficiary.2°9
One of the most significant reasons why rape victims do not receive the
same benefits as defendants during the trial process is that rape victims
are not represented by an attorney during the trial. Rape victims are
the prosecution's chief witnesses in the proceedings, but prosecutors do
not represent the victims.2 1 ' Rather, prosecutors advocate on behalf of
212the state. Oftentimes, "the interests of the state ... conflict with those
of the victim. 2 1 3 In contrast, defense attorneys are zealous advocates for
the defendants they represent; 214 their singular role is to advocate on
behalf of their client's best interests.215
D. Victims' Rights Statutes and Amendments Offer a Means of Enforcing
Rape Shield Statutes
Damaging media coverage about the victim coupled with a
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused celebrity combine to
effectively deprive the victim of a "fair trial., 216 Rape shield statutes
217alone cannot withstand the pressure of such powerful influences.Victims' rights statutes and amendments offer a means by which rape
205. Cf. id. (noting possible alternatives for victim protections).
206. Cf Stephen, supra note 3, at 1083 (noting that pretrial publicity threatens
defendant's chance for a fair trial); Morris, supra note 37, at 907-08 (stating that a gag
order was necessary to protect the defendant).
207. Cf Stephen, supra note 3, at 1086 (noting that change of venue would increase
defendant's chance for a fair trial).
208. Cf. id.
209. Cf. id. at 1083 (noting procedural concerns regarding change of venue and their
benefit to defendant); Morris, supra note 37, at 907-08 (noting procedural concerns
regarding a gag order and their benefits to the defendant).
210. See Snow, supra note 6, at 253 (noting that "the prosecutor is not an advocate for






216. See Hermida, supra note 16, at 202-03.
217. Cf. id.
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shield statutes can function properly in high-profile cases.2" Although
victims' rights statutes and amendments were not created to supplement
rape shield statutes, they can further the goal of rape shield laws by
preventing disclosure of personal information about the rape victim until
the trial is complete.2 9
Victims' rights statutes and amendments are properly situated to assist
rape shield laws in achieving the goal of victim privacy throughout the
2201
entire trial process. It is significant to note that both address privacy
issues outside of the courtroom. 22' Rape shield statutes do not extend
beyond the walls of the courtroom; they only control the flow of
information within the courtroom. 222 Thus, they fail to function properly
when information that would otherwise be inadmissible at trial is
nonetheless made available to the jury through the media.
223 Victims'
rights statues and amendments offer a means of controlling what rape
shield statutes in high-profile cases cannot: the flow of information into
the courtroom.224
Victims' rights statutes and amendments have the ability to prevent the
media from disclosing information to potential jurors before the trial
begins.22' This element is crucial to the overall effectiveness of rape
126
shield statutes. By disallowing the jury from receiving this damaging
information before the commencement of the trial, victims' rights
statutes and amendments would preclude potential jurors from
formulating biased opinions about the victim based on wholly
inadmissible evidence,227 thus allowing rape shield statutes to properly
218. See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.56 (West 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
265, § 24C (West 2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.3771 (Michie 2001); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-730 (Law. Co-op. 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-37-3 (2004); see also supra
note 20.
219. See § 92.56; ch. 265, § 24C; § 200.3771; § 16-3-730; § 77-37-3; see also supra note
20.
220. See § 92.56 (covering all court records); ch. 265, § 24C (covering courts and police
departments); § 200.3771 (covering court records and investigative data); § 16-3-730
(covering crimes committed or alleged); see also supra note 20.
221. See Johnson, supra note 21; Giannini, supra note 21, at 1157.
222. See Anderson, supra note 15.
223. See Hermida, supra note 16, at 146.
224. See § 92.56; ch. 265, § 24C; § 200.3771; § 16-3-730; § 77-37-3; see also supra note
20.
225. See § 92.56; ch. 265, § 24C; § 200.3771; § 16-3-730; § 77-37-3; see also supra note
20.
226. See Anderson, supra note 15.
227. Cf. Hermida, supra note 16 (noting unavoidable bias created by pretrial
publicity).
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function.228 Preventing publication of damaging information during the
219trial itself would further strengthen rape shield statutes .
E. Victims' Rights Statutes and Amendments in Their Current Form
Cannot Effectively Enforce Rape Shield Statutes
Because victims' rights statutes and amendments have the capacity to
control the content of information that is disclosed by the media to the
230general public, they are the ideal complement to rape shield statutes.
In their current form, however, the statutes and amendments are not
without shortcomings,"' including language that fails to properly exclude
damaging information about the victim's background from publication232 233
by the media, 32 ineffective enforcement of violations by the courts, 3 and
minimal penalties imposed on violators.2 4 Such shortcomings prevent
these measures from filling all of the gaps created in rape shield statutes
by extensive media coverage. 21' Thus, as they currently exist, neither is
completely effective in enforcing rape shield statutes. 6
Modification of current rape shield statutes to prevent the media from
publishing harmful information about the victim presents one option for
change, though a more efficacious alternative focused on modification of
victims' rights statutes and amendments appears more appropriate.
Rape shield statutes address privacy rights within the trial process itself,
whereas victims' rights statutes and amendments deal with a victim's
right to privacy in society at large . Since victims' rights statutes and
228. See Anderson, supra note 15.
229. Cf. Hermida, supra note 16 (discussing the dangers of publicizing inadmissible
evidence).
230. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 211 n.57; Giannini, supra note 21, at 1157.
231. For example, victims' rights statutes do not prevent the media from publishing
damaging background information about the plaintiff. Berlin, supra note 3, at 520.
Additionally, victims' rights amendments are often vaguely worded, using permissive
rather than mandatory language. See, e.g., Giannini, supra note 21, at 1168. They also do
not establish guidelines as to how they are to be interpreted or enforced. Id. at 1167.
232. See Berlin, supra note 3, at 520.
233. Giannini, supra note 21, at 1167; see Johnson, supra note 21, at 212.
234. Examples of such penalties are: a $2,500$10,000 fine, criminal contempt, and a
misdemeanor conviction-a violator can be fined either up to $1,000 or imprisoned for not
more than three years. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 24C (West 2000); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.3771 (Michie 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-730 (Law. Co-op.
2003). See generally supra note 20.
235. Extensive media coverage could easily skirt the limits of many victims' rights
statutes by preying on the vague language and limited reach of these statutes. Cf ch. 265,
§ 24C; § 200.3771; § 16-3-730; supra note 20.
236. Victims' rights statutes and amendments do not prevent the media from
disclosing to the public information about a rape victim's past sexual behavior. Cf ch. 265,
§ 24C; § 200.3771; § 16-3-730.
237. See Snow, supra note 6, at 245; see also supra note 221 and accompanying text.
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amendments are already in place to prevent information from reaching
the media, they are better situated and designed to withstand such
modification.
III. MODIFICATION OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS STATUTES AND AMENDMENTS
A. Language Modification
Modifying the present formulations of victims' rights statutes and
amendments to ensure more effective support for rape shield statutes
serves as a step toward properly securing a "fair trial" for rape victims.
Changing the language of victims' rights statutes and amendments is
significant, as the current language of victims' rights statutes only
disallows the media from publishing the name and identity of a rape
victim.23s  No other prohibition against publishing other damaging
information exists.239 Conceivably, then, the media is free to publish
information about the victim that may have a profound, adverse impact
on the victim's right to a "fair trial," as long the media does not reveal
the victim's name, address, telephone number, etc.241 In order for
victims' rights statutes to assist in the enforcement of rape shield statutes,
which extensive media coverage has effectively invalidated, this language
must be changed.
Not only do state legislatures need to enact rape-specific victims' rights
statutes, they also need to revise these statutes so that the language
clearly disallows any information about the victim from being published
before or during the trial. Legislatures should bar the publication of
the victim's name, identity, and any other background information
pertaining to the victim. The revised statutes would thus expand the
238. See Berlin, supra note 3, at 520; cf § 92.56 (preventing publication of rape victims'
identity); ch. 265, § 24C (protecting confidentiality of rape victims' names); § 200.3771
(protecting rape victims' identities); § 16-3-730 (disallowing publication of a rape victim's
name).
239. See Berlin, supra note 3, at 520.
240. See id.
241. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 508-09 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that preventing the broadcasting
company from publicizing the name of the rape victim did not impermissibly infringe on
the media's First Amendment right.
In this case nothing more is at issue than the right to report the name of the
victim of a rape. No hindrance of any sort has been imposed on reporting the
fact of a rape or the circumstances surrounding it. Yet the Court unquestioningly
places this issue on a par with the core First Amendment [issue,] . . . that of
protecting the press in its role of providing uninhibited political discourse.
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impact of rape shield statutes, giving the victim greater pretrial
protection.
Victims' rights amendments should adopt similar changes. Instead of
offering constitutional protection to crime victims generally, legislatures
should seek to revise victims' rights amendments to extend constitutional
protections specifically to rape victims. The language would no longer
speak of rights and guarantees in generalities.24 For example, victims'
rights amendments would reflect the language adopted by victims' rights
statutes prohibiting disclosure of the victim's name, identity, or any other
information about the victim. 243 Amendments should also contain a sub-
category that would apply to rape victims involved in high-profile
cases.2 44 These changes would create a rape-specific amendment that
would guarantee to high-profile rape victims an absolute constitutional• 24-5
right to privacy both before and during the trial.
B. Remedying Punishment Inadequacies
Changes in the language of victims' rights statutes should entail not
only modifications of the circumstances under which violators can, and
will, be punished, but also the types of punishments that will be imposed.
As written, victims' rights statutes impose minimal sanctions upon
246 247violators. Some statutes simply fine violators a nominal amount., 2481
Others impose minor criminal sanctions. In either case, punishment is
minimal.
Proper enforcement of these statutes calls for an increase in the-• 249
severity of punishment for violations. Any violation, regardless of how
242. See Giannini, supra note 21, at 1167 (identifying a general lack of clarity in laws
seeking to protect victims' rights).
243. Cf. id. (suggesting that the prescribed methods for protecting victims' rights in
state statutes need to be more clearly defined).
244. Cf id. (noting that a similar lack of clarity exists in victims' rights statutes
generally).
245. Cf. id. (arguing that victims' rights laws generally do not specifically identify exact
protections).
246. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 24C (West 2000) (fining violators "not less
than two thousand five hundred dollars nor more than ten thousand dollars"); NEv. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 200.3771 (Michie 2001) (stating that violators will be subject to criminal
contempt); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-730 (Law. Co-op. 2003) (stating that violators will be
fined up to one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than three years).
247. See ch. 265, § 24C.
248. See § 200.3771; § 16-3-730.
249. Cf Susan A. Bernstein, Note, Environmental Criminal Law: The Use of
Confinement for Criminal Violators of the Federal Clean Water Act, 17 NEw ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 107, 118 (1991). Although referring to penalties imposed for
violations of environmental statutes, the same underlying theory can be extended to
victims' rights statutes and amendments. "Nearly all commentators agree that in order for
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minor it may appear, should be punished with a substantial fine and
mandatory jail sentence. 20 Harsh penalties will alert potential violators
that these statutes are not to be taken lightly.
C. Freedom of the Press as a Legal Obstacle to Modification
The most considerable legal obstacle to the modification of victims'
rights statutes and amendments is the media's right to freedom of the
press. 51 Such an obstacle persists because courts have previously been
criminal sanctions to be effective, they must be used vigorously. Fines attached to
penalties 'must exceed, by a substantial amount, the illegal gain."' Id. (citation omitted).
250. Cf id. at 117-18.
251. The Court distinguishes information that is generally available to the public and
the media from court records and information that is unlawfully obtained and published
by the media. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975). The Cox majority
held that the broadcasting company could not be held liable for publicizing the name of a
deceased rape victim because the information was obtained from court records that were
available to the public. The majority opinion stated:
We are reluctant to embark on a course that would make public records
generally available to the media but forbid their publication if offensive to the
sensibilities of the supposed reasonable man. Such a rule would make it very
difficult for the media to inform citizens about the public business and yet stay
within the law. The rule would invite timidity and self-censorship and very likely
lead to the suppression of many items that would otherwise be published and
that should be made available to the public. At the very least, the First and
Fourteenth Amendments will not allow exposing the press to liability for
truthfully publishing information released to the public in official court records.
Id. In its opinion, the Court offered a suggestion as to how states could protect the privacy
rights of rape victims without implicating the media's right to the freedom of the press.
The Court seemed to indicate that state intervention is the only means to prevent the
media from publishing legally obtainable private information about rape victims. The
Court stated:
If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the States
must respond by means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of
private information. Their political institutions must weigh the interests in
privacy with the interests of the public to know and of the press to publish.
Id. The majority opinion pointed out an important responsibility on the part of states in
preventing police reports and judicial records pertaining to rape victims from being
accessible to the public and thereby the media. See id. The Court placed the burden on
the state to avoid this clash between the media's right to the freedom of the press and a
rape victim's right to privacy. Id. Although a state could conceivably prevent the media
from obtaining information about rape victims by sealing public records, this would not
necessarily prevent the media from obtaining information through other means.
Inquisitive reporters will no doubt locate other sources that provide them with
information that is generally unavailable to the public. Thus, the state's role in making
information available to the public, or preventing it from being generally accessible is not
entirely dispositive of the issue. Because the media will nonetheless find ways to access
the information without relying on public documents, the suggestion that state
governments can preempt a clash between rape victim's privacy rights and the media's
First Amendment right is a considerably more complex issue than the majority
acknowledged. See id. State action would also not be nearly as effective as the Court
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 54:297
unwilling to categorically recognize a victim's right to privacy as a
compelling state interest that would justify curtailing the media's First
Amendment right. 212 Despite this willingness to uphold the freedom of
253the press at the expense of victims' rights to privacy, the Supreme
Court has made clear that its holdings are limited . 54 Particular holdings
are only meant to apply to the fact pattern of the specific case before the
Court. Thus, it is possible that, under other circumstances, a rape
victim's right to privacy could overcome the media's First Amendment
right."'
Such narrow holdings recognize the broader policy considerations of
protecting rape victims' privacy rights.57 Allowing the media to publicize
opined if the media were to publish the information obtained through these alternative
methods, assuming the information was legally obtained. See id.
252. The Supreme Court has left open the possibility that privacy rights could
conceivably outweigh the media's right to freedom of the press under some circumstances.
See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989). The Court stated:
Our holding today is limited. We do not hold that truthful publication is
automatically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of personal
privacy within which the State may protect the individual from intrusion by the
press, or even that a State may never punish publication of the name of a victim
of a sexual offense.
Id.; Cox, 420 U.S. at 491 (recognizing that both privacy rights and the right to freedom of
the press are "plainly routed in the traditions and significant concerns of our society");
Johnson, supra note 21, at 204.
253. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 204-05.
254. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533 (stating that "the sensitivity and significance of
the interests presented in clashes between First Amendment and privacy rights counsels
the Court to rely on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate
context of the instant case").
255. See id. at 530 ("[A]lthough our decisions have without exception upheld the
press' right to publish, we have emphasized each time that we were resolving this
conflict only as it arose in a discrete factual context.").
256. See Kevin O'Brien, South Carolina: Last Haven for Rape Victim Privacy?, 50 S.C.
L. REV. 873, 877-78 (1999). O'Brien comments on the Florida Star decision:
Despite the Court's ruling [in Florida Star], it did not preclude the possibility of a
constitutional rape shield statute: "We do not hold ... that a State may never
punish publication of the name of a victim of a sexual offense." In addition, the
Court did "not rule out the possibility that, in a proper case, imposing civil
sanctions for publication of the name of a rape victim might be . . .
overwhelmingly necessary to advance" the interests of the state. The Court
instead very narrowly held that punishing the truthful publication of lawfully
obtained, publicly significant information must support a significant state
interest. It determined that the state interests advanced, namely encouraging
victims of sexual assault to report the crime as well as ensuring the privacy and
safety of those victims, were "highly significant" but, "under the circumstances of
this case," did not warrant the imposition of liability.
Id.
257. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 537 (recognizing that "the privacy of victims of sexual
offenses; the physical safety of such victims, who may be targeted for retaliation if their
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damaging information about rape victims decreases the likelihood that
victims will report sexual assaults to authorities.28 Media publicity also
fosters negative stereotypes about women and sexuality.259 Thus, under
certain circumstances, the public policy of disallowing publication of
information about rape victims could conceivably outweigh the value to
the public of receiving such mformatlon.
names become known to their assailants; and the goal of encouraging victims of such
crimes to report these offenses without fear of exposure" are "highly significant
interests").
258. Cf. Berlin, supra note 3, at 520. Berlin comments on the impact media disclosure
has on the reporting rates of rape victims.
Privacy supporters highlight the fact that there is apparently a wide base of
popular public support for the concepts underlying legislation that prohibits
disclosure of rape victims' names. Various studies have revealed that a large
majority of people in the United States favor victim privacy. Those interviewed
affirmatively prioritize privacy interests more highly than press freedoms.
Similar studies indicate that rape victims allege they would be far more willing
and likely to come forward, report the crime, and assist the authorities as
necessary, if statutorily enforced anonymity were available or dependable.
Stated differently, "[n]aming rape victims would lead to a sharp decline in the
reporting of rape crimes." In 1992, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
estimated that only one in ten victims reported rape. Such a low ratio is rather
persuasive when arguing that society should recognize rape as a narrow area in
which First Amendment standards should be relaxed.
Id. (alteration in original)
259. See Coughlin, supra note 7, at 5-6. David Ellis, Toward a Consistent Recognition
of the Forbidden Inference: The Illinois Rape Shield Statute, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 395, 395-96 (1992). Ellis comments that traditional stereotypes about
women served as the basis for allowing the introduction of information about the victim's
past sexual behavior into the courtroom:
The theory that disclosure of a woman's sexual past was necessary to determine
whether she was victimized by the defendant was empowered by two stereotypes.
First, the stereotypically unchaste complainant, by nature of her "promiscuity,"
lacked credibility. Both judges and jurors were likely to consider such an alleged
victim as either unworthy of belief in general or, more specifically, likely to
fabricate charges of sexual assault. The second stereotype regarding
complainants was that a woman who has consented to sexual activity on one
occasion will always consent: "if she did it once, she'd do it again."
Id.; Vachss, supra note 8.
260. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 553 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, dissented from the opinion of the Court.
I would find a place to draw the line higher on the hillside: a spot high enough to
protect B. J. F.'s desire for privacy and peace-of-mind in the wake of a horrible
personal tragedy. There is no public interest in publishing the names, addresses,
and phone numbers of persons who are the victims of crime-and no public
interest in immunizing the press from liability in the rare cases where a State's
efforts to protect a victim's privacy have failed.
Id.; Berlin, supra note 3, at 520-21.
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D. Role of the Courts
Because they are responsible for enforcing penalties, courts play a vital
role in protecting the rights of rape victims. Although violators
presumably will argue that such statutes infringe on the media's right of
261freedom of the press, courts cannot fall prey to this argument. Just as
legislatures need to reevaluate the justifications behind modifying
current victims' rights statutes and amendments, courts must do the
same.262 Courts must revisit the idea that the trial process continues, to
263some degree, to treat rape victims as defendants.
Judges must also realize that victims' rights statutes and amendments,
while seeking to protect a victim's right to privacy, stand for much264
more. These statutes and amendments provide an out-of-court means
by which rape shield statutes can effectively prevent harmful information
about a victim's past sexual history from disclosure to potential jurors.265
Thus, victims' rights statutes and amendments stand not only for the
protection of a victim's right to privacy, but they also represent the
notion that rape victims are entitled to receive a "fair trial.
2 66
IV. CONCLUSION
Rape shield statutes serve to diminish the harsh treatment that rape
victims receive during a criminal trial. Therefore, the media should not
be allowed to nullify the statutes' effectiveness during the trial process.
Based on the current system, rape victims in high-profile cases are not
receiving a "fair trial" because the media is rendering rape shield statutes
almost completely ineffective. Although there is little that can be done
to eliminate entirely the effects of media influence on potential jurors in
regard to celebrity defendants, much can be done to minimize the effects
on rape victims. Victims' rights statutes and amendments offer a means
of minimizing those effects. If legislatures modify the language of these
statutes and amendments to reflect the language contained in rape shield
statutes, the media will be prevented from releasing information about
261. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 201.
262. Cf CUKLANZ, supra note 57, at 31-32; Snow, supra note 6.
263. Burgess-Jackson, supra note 7.
264. Victims' rights statutes and amendments offer a means by which rape victims can
be protected from the victimization that typically occurs. Cf FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.56
(West 1999) (protecting rape victims specifically); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 24C
(West 2000) (protecting confidentiality of rape victims' names); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
200.3771 (Michie 2001) (protecting rape victims' identities); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-730
(Law. Co-op. 2003) (protecting rape victims specifically); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-37-3
(creating a bill of rights for victims of all crime); see also supra note 20.
265. See, e.g. § 92.56; ch. 265, § 24C; § 200.3771; § 16-3-730; supra note 20.
266. See Westbrook, supra note 113, at 575.
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rape victims to the public. The advantages to rape victims are two-fold.
Victims' rights statutes and amendments not only protect a victim's right
to privacy, but they also serve to reinforce and protect rape shield
statutes from the harmful effects of extensive media coverage. By
allowing rape shield statutes to function properly, victims' rights statutes
and amendments ensure that rape victims will receive a "fair trial."
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